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BETWEEN JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY AND PARLIAMENTARY
SUPREMACY: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT’S DILEMMA
IN CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
Tan Seow Hon*
This article considers the dilemma that constitutional judicial review presents to the most well-
meaning of judges—that of navigating the narrow and difficult road between parliamentary
supremacy and judicial oligarchy. It examines the Singapore Court of Appeal’s delineation of legal
and extra-legal considerations in view of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of adjudication in determining
the constitutionality of s 377A of the Penal Code in Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015]
1 SLR 26 (CA). It proposes an alternative natural law approach to constitutional judicial review
based on Radbruch’s formula, which helps courts to avoid the pitfalls of judicial idiosyncrasies and
usurpation of legislative mandate while staying true to constitutionalism.
I. The Special Dilemma of the Courts
in Constitutional Judicial Review
In the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States, Roe v Wade1 is regarded as
a classic example of judicial activism. The United States Supreme Court (“US
SC”) ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment2 of the Constitution of the United
States3 guaranteed the right to privacy under the idea of “liberty”, and this right
included a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.4 Restrictive abortion laws
passed by a state or the federal government were unconstitutional. Even some
supporters of permissive abortion laws were of the view that such laws should
have been legislatively enacted:5 Roe v Wade was seen as an encroachment by the
judiciary, through the creative reading of a constitutional provision, on legislative
mandate.6
∗ Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University.
1 410 US 113 (1973).
2 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution provides that a state shall not “deprive
any person of. . . liberty. . . without due process of law. . .”: US Const amend XIV.
3 US Const [US Constitution].
4 Roe v Wade, supra note 1 at 152-154.
5 See eg, John Hart Ely, “The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v Wade” (1973) 82 Yale LJ 920.
6 See eg, Justice Rehnquist’s comment in his dissenting judgment on the court’s judicial legislation in
Roe v Wade, supra note 1 at 172-177. See, also, the discussion by Justice Scalia in Lawrence v Texas,
539 US 558 at 587-592 (2003) [Lawrence].
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Judges involved in constitutional interpretation, while not being “timorous souls”7
and while rightfully ensuring that constitutionally-protected rights are given effect
to, would do well to discern the actual scope of fundamental liberties. The adoption
of a written constitution calls for a more rigorous check, than in the case of parlia-
mentary supremacy, on the laws that Parliament passes. But the judicial function in
checking legislation is to enforce the constitution: a government based on constitu-
tional supremacy should not turn into a judicial oligarchy or a juristocracy8—a rule by
judges as they creatively rewrite the constitution or substantially arrogate law-making
powers to themselves under the guise of enforcing the constitution. Constitutional
judicial review presents a special dilemma, to the most well-meaning of judges, of
navigating the narrow and difficult road between parliamentary supremacy and juris-
tocracy. Judges acting in bad faith would not be confronted with such a dilemma,
as they would either engage in judicial legislation, or rubber-stamp whatever law
Parliament passes.
The Singapore Court of Appeal (“CA”) confronted this dilemma in Lim Meng
Suang v Attorney-General.9 LMS/TEH was the culmination of appeals from the High
Court (“HC”) decisions of Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General10 and Tan Eng Hong
v Attorney-General.11 As both cases concerned challenges to the constitutionality
of s 377A of the Penal Code12 in view of arts 9 and/or 12 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Singapore,13 they were heard together. This article will use the CA’s
calibration of constitutional judicial review as a launch-pad for the discussion of the
dilemma facing courts in constitutional judicial review. The HC’s judgments will be
examined insofar as they offer a different calibration. As pertinent comments were
subsequently made by the CAinYongVui Kong v Public Prosecutor,14 I shall examine
whether those comments qualify or advance the CA’s approach in LMS/TEH.
In Part II, I shall provide a brief background relating to s 377A, beginning with the
controversial legislative review and subsequent retention of s 377A in Singapore’s
Parliament in 2007, and culminating in the legal challenges made in LMS/TEH. In
Part III, I shall examine the CA’s judgment in light of the dilemma mentioned. In this
regard, three aspects are of especial interest: the interpretation of art 9; the protection
of equality and the reasonable classification test; and the classification of legal and
extra-legal considerations. In Part IV, I shall propose an approach to constitutional
judicial review, based on what has been termed “Radbruch’s formula”,15 which helps
the courts to properly navigate between parliamentary supremacy and juristocracy.
I conclude in Part V with a brief survey of challenges of the times we live in.
7 I borrow Lord Denning’s term in Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164 at 178 (CA)
(Denning LJ’s dissent).
8 Henceforth, I shall use the term “juristocracy” to refer to a judicial oligarchy. The term has been used,
for example, by Hirschl in Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the
New Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
9 [2015] 1 SLR 26 (CA) [LMS/TEH].
10 [2013] 3 SLR 118 (HC) [LMS (HC)].
11 [2013] 4 SLR 1059 (HC) [TEH (HC)].
12 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed Sing.
13 1999 Rev Ed [Singapore Constitution].
14 [2015] 2 SLR 1129 (CA) [Yong Vui Kong (2015)].
15 See eg, Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009) at 40.
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II. The Criminal Law Review of 2007 and the Constitutional Challenge
Given the highly polarised debate in and outside of Parliament, in 2007 and before,
concerning the legal regulation of homosexual acts,16 the constitutional challenges
in LMS/TEH were unsurprising.
According to s 377A:
Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets the commission
of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of,
any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years.17
Section 377A was extensively debated in Parliament in 2007 when its repeal was not
tabled in the Penal Code (Amendment) Bill,18 which had “77 provisions expanded,
updated or clarified, four provisions repealed, and 21 new offices enacted to address
identified gaps in the law, strengthen enforcement capability and accord better pro-
tection to vulnerable persons.”19 Relatedly, the then-s 377, which prohibited “carnal
intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animals”,20 was
repealed, with bestial acts covered under the new s 377B. The retention of s 377A,
the repeal of the then-s 377, and the enactment of the new s 377B meant that bestial
acts and homosexual acts between male persons remain criminalised, while hetero-
sexual acts “against the order of nature” and homosexual acts between female persons
were not criminalised. The government sought feedback from the public; intense
debate in the public square preceded the second reading of the Bill with emails and
letters being sent to government leaders;21 two opposing internet campaigns were
mounted to garner support for online letters to the Prime Minister. A petition was
presented by Nominated Member of Parliament Siew Kum Hong in Parliament on
behalf of those hoping for repeal, on the ground that the provision was an “unconsti-
tutional derogation from the constitutional guarantee of equality and equal protection
of the law as set out in Article 12(1) of the Constitution.”22 The government decided
to retain s 377A, but the Prime Minister said it would not be pro-actively enforced.23
In light of the allegation that the provision was unconstitutional, the worldwide
movement in relation to homosexual rights, and increased visibility of homosexuals
16 In 2003, the then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong had acknowledged that homosexuals were hired in
sensitive government positions. From about that time, there was also increased visibility of what was
to some groups in society an alternative lifestyle. This was discussed in Tan Seow Hon, “Pragmatism,
Morals Legislation and the Criminalization of Homosexual Acts in Singapore” (2008) 3 Journal of
Comparative Law 285 at 292.
17 Penal Code, supra note 12, s 377A.
18 No 38 of 2007, Sing [Bill].
19 Parliamentary Debates Singapore: Official Report, vol 83 at col 2175 (22 October 2007) (Senior
Minister of State for Law, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee).
20 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed Sing), s 377.
21 Parliamentary Debates Singapore: Official Report, vol 83 at col 2397 (23 October 2007) (Prime Minister
Lee Hsien Loong) [Parliamentary Debates (23 October 2007)].
22 Parliamentary Debates Singapore: Official Report, vol 83 at col 2121 (22 October 2007) (Mr Siew
Kum Hong).
23 Parliamentary Debates (23 October 2007), supra note 21 at col 2401.
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in Singapore,24 the constitutional challenge in LMS/TEH was unsurprising. The two
contexts in which the homosexual acts occurred were, however, worlds apart.
Tan Eng Hong had been arrested for engaging in oral sex in a cubicle in a public
toilet of a shopping complex and was initially charged under s 377A—a charge later
substituted with another charge under s 294(a) of the Penal Code, concerning the
commission of an obscene act in a public place. Prior to the substitution, Tan Eng
Hong had brought an application to challenge s 377A for violating arts 9, 12, and
14 of the Singapore Constitution. When the charge was substituted, the Attorney-
General applied to strike out Tan Eng Hong’s application for disclosing no reasonable
cause of action, being frivolous or vexatious, and/or being an abuse of court process.
The CA found that Tan Eng Hong had the locus standi to make the application as
he had initially been arrested, investigated, detained and charged exclusively under
s 377A.25 The issue arose as to whether these acts were “in accordance with law”
within the meaning of art 9(1), given that s 377A was arguably inconsistent with
art 12 of the Singapore Constitution. Moreover, there remained a real and credible
threat of prosecution under s 377A. Tan Eng Hong was allowed to vindicate his rights
through a constitutional challenge.
Lim Meng Suang (“Lim”) and his partner, Kenneth Chee Mun-Leon (“Chee”),
challenged s 377A for infringing art 12 of the Singapore Constitution. They had been
“in a romantic and sexual relationship” with each other since 1997.26 Both said they
had experienced discrimination and that s 377A had reinforced the discrimination,
as “the very existence of this provision, whether or not it is enforced, [labelled] them
as criminals.”27
While Tan Eng Hong’s case concerned a sexual act in a public toilet, Lim’s case
concerned sexual acts within a long-term homosexual relationship. On the one hand,
the nature of the relationship of the parties engaging in the acts proscribed by s 377A
should not affect the outcome of their respective constitutional challenges. On the
other, given that emotive appeals were made during the 2007 criminal law review in
Parliament about how homosexuals were like the rest of citizens, the general public
might have been more sympathetic to Lim’s case for a right to sexual intimacy in the
context of a long and stable relationship.28
Lim and Chee challenged s 377A as it was “always at the back of their minds
that if the authorities wanted to, they could arrest them and charge them”29 under
s 377A. Ironically, despite losing their case after the disclosure about their sexual
relationship, they were not arrested. While there is no assurance that they would never
be prosecuted, inasmuch as they were permitted to continue to go on with their lives,
the omission is consistent with the government’s stance during the parliamentary
debates that it would not pro-actively enforce s 377A.
24 See eg, the activism of Pink Dot SG, a non-profit movement, online: Pink Dot SG <http://pinkdot.sg/
about-pink-dot/>.
25 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 at para 186 (CA) [TEH (CA)].
26 LMS (HC), supra note 10 at para 2.
27 Ibid at para 7.
28 The parties appealed to the public to raise funds for their litigation costs, online: YouTube
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qOyWOz1LyUY>.
29 LMS (HC), supra note 10 at para 7.
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III. Legal and Extra-Legal Arguments in Constitutional Judicial Review
I shall consider the CA’s interpretation of arts 9 and 12 of the Singapore Constitu-
tion and its delineation of legal and extra-legal considerations, examining the HC’s
reasoning insofar as it offers an alternative perspective of constitutional judicial
review.
A. Liberty and the Right to Privacy: Article 9
According to art 9(1), no person shall be “deprived of life or personal liberty save in
accordance with law.”30 The CA held that this guaranteed freedom from unlawful
deprivation of life and unlawful detention or incarceration.31 Two points are worth
noting. First, the definitive statement of the CA that there was no general constitu-
tional right to privacy or personal autonomy in art 9(1)32 settled Singapore’s position
on a constitutional provision that was as close as any could get to the substantive
due process clause of the US Constitution: the substantive due process jurisprudence
was rejected. Any right to privacy should be developed by way of private law on
privacy. Moreover, the CA noted that the limited right being asserted was poten-
tially unlimited, as it might “legalise all manner of subjective expressions of love
and affection, which could (in turn) embody content that may be wholly unaccept-
able from the perspective of broader societal policy”, though the CA acknowledged
that this raised the question of whether broader societal morality ought to have been
enforced by s 377A.33 The second point concerns the interpretation of the phrase,
“in accordance with law”. Tan Eng Hong’s counsel had argued that the “law” should
not be “arbitrary” or “absurd”.34 The CA’s dismissal of the argument is, strictly,
not a rejection of the requirements of “law”, but involved a narrower finding that
absurdity had not been established when conflicting evidence was relied upon: the
acts proscribed were clear;35 there was no legal substantiation as to why “signalling
societal disapproval of grossly indecent acts between males was arbitrary”;36 the
argument for absurdity—that a minority was criminalised “based on a core aspect
of their identity which was either unchangeable or suppressible only at a great per-
sonal cost”37—hinged on conflicting scientific views about immutability that the CA
thought were beyond its remit.38
I have elsewhere argued that a jurisprudential debate between legal positivists
and natural law theorists is implicated in the interpretation of the word “law” in art
9(1).39 The meaning of “law” cannot be settled as a matter of definitions found in the
30 Singapore Constitution, supra note 13, art 9.
31 LMS/TEH, supra note 9 at para 46.
32 Ibid at para 44.
33 Ibid at para 49.
34 Ibid at paras 51, 52.
35 Ibid at para 51.
36 Ibid at para 52.
37 Ibid at para 53.
38 Ibid.
39 Tan Seow Hon, “Constitutional Jurisprudence: Beyond Supreme Law: A Law Higher Still?” in Thio Li-
ann & Kevin Y L Tan, eds, Evolution of a Revolution: 40 Years of the Singapore Constitution (London:
Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) at 79-113 [Tan, “Constitutional Jurisprudence”].
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interpretive provisions of written law. While “law” is defined in art 2, the definition
is non-exhaustive as law is said to include “written law and any. . . other enactment
or instrument. . . in operation in Singapore”. In turn, s 2 of the Interpretation Act40
suggests that “written law” means “the Constitution. . . and enactments by whatever
name called. . . for the time being in force in Singapore”. Therefore, “law” in art 9(1)
includes what is validly passed by Parliament which is “in operation”. But what else
is included in the reference to “law” in art 9(1)? This is important because whatever
violates art 9(1) would not be in operation.41 In other words, whether a statute that
deprives one of life or personal liberty that Parliament attempts to pass would be “in
operation” hinges on whether it is passed in accordance with “law”, and this hinges
on the interpretation of “law”. Jurisprudential debates as to what counts as “law”
are implicated in the interpretation of art 9(1), which was what the Privy Council
in Ong Ah Chuan thought when it referred to the rules of natural justice as having
been incorporated.42 Or, “law”, according to a wider interpretation, such as a natural
law interpretation, incorporates Radbruch’s formula according to which manifestly
unjust laws are not laws.43 I shall argue in Part IV that preferring the natural law
understanding, over a positivistic one that refers to law as a social fact, for example,
to be determined by the sovereign44 or what people recognise to be law,45 does
not lend itself to the sort of subjectivity the CA is concerned with. Crucially, this
is different from the approach regarding the substantive due process clause in the
United States. The CA’s rejection of the argument of Tan Eng Hong that s 377A is
absurd in view of immutability is a rejection of the finding of absurdity in the context
of this case, not a rejection of the court’s intervention in a case when evidence is not
conflicting and a law is on its face truly irrational. Instances of absurdity, however,
usually implicate art 12,46 to which we now turn.
B. Equality and the Reasonable Classification Test: Article 12
According to art 12(1), “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and entitled to the
equal protection of the law.”47 Article 12(2) specifies that, “[e]xcept as expressly
40 Cap 1, 1997 Rev Ed Sing.
41 This was also noted by the Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1979-1980] SLR (R)
710 at para 25 (PC) [Ong Ah Chuan].
42 Ibid at para 26.
43 See Part IV of this article below.
44 See Austin’s theory of law as sovereign commands: John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence
Determined (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1998).
45 According to Hart, law is a system of rules, which are determined to be valid by a rule of recognition of
the legal system. In England, for example, the rule of recognition suggests that whatever the Queen in
Parliament enacts is the law. Legal validity is found as a matter of social practice, by determining what
the rule of recognition is. The content of the rule of recognition is “shown in the way in which particular
rules are identified, either by courts or other officials or private persons or their advisers”: H L A Hart,
The Concept of Law, 2d ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at 101. Such persons manifest the internal
point of view—an acceptance of the rules in question as standards, displayed by: criticism of those who
deviate or threaten to deviate from them; demands for conformity; an acknowledgment that the line of
conduct and the criticisms and demands in question are proper and justified; and the use of normative
vocabulary of “ought”, “must”, “should”, “right” and “wrong”: Hart, ibid at 82-91, 102, 103.
46 This is not always the case. For example, proving irrationality under art 9 may be simpler in that it does
not require the identification of discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis another class.
47 Singapore Constitution, supra note 13, art 12(1).
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authorised by [the] Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens of
Singapore on the ground only of religion, race, descent, or place of birth in any law”
or in relation to various other matters.48 The appellants in LMS/TEH argued that
they should be protected from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; that
s 377A was so absurd, arbitrary and unreasonable that it could not be good law; and
that it failed the reasonable classification test.
According to the Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan, art 12(1) “assures to the
individual. . . the right to equal treatment with other individuals in similar circum-
stances.”49 The court noted that whether the dissimilarity in circumstances justified
differentiation in the punishment, and if so, what the appropriate punishments were,
were “questions of social policy” for the legislature rather than the judiciary to
decide: if the factor constituting the dissimilarity in circumstances that the Legisla-
ture adopted was not “purely arbitrary” but “[bore] a reasonable relation to the social
object of the law”, there was no violation of art 12(1).50 In Ong Ah Chuan, the
most dangerously addictive drugs had been singled out to stamp out the illicit drug
trade, and the social evil caused by trafficking could be seen as broadly proportional
to the quantity of drugs trafficked. There was nothing unreasonable in the legisla-
ture’s decision that a dealer nearer “the apex of the distributive pyramid [required] a
stronger deterrent” and deserved a “more condign punishment”.51 Where the quan-
titative barrier lay was for the legislature to decide in light of information available
to it, and no plausible reason had been advanced for suggesting that the line drawn
by the statute was so low as to be purely arbitrary.52
The deference to legislative judgment is facilitated by the presumption of constitu-
tionality in the application of the reasonable classification test. According to the CA
in Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong,53 the elected legislature is taken to better
appreciate the needs of a society and has the mandate to decide questions of social
policy. The court should generally uphold legislation if it is possible to do so on any
reasonable ground. The party attacking the legislation must place all the material
or factual evidence before the court to show either the enactment or the exercise of
power under it is arbitrary and that the classification does not rest on a reasonable
basis. Postulating examples of arbitrariness is insufficient to rebut the presumption
of constitutionality if the legislation is not arbitrary on its face. In Taw Cheng Kong,
the object of the Prevention of Corruption Act54 was to more effectively control
and prevent corruption: the provision in question captured corrupt acts of Singapore
citizens, in or outside of Singapore. The breadth of the provision was in line with
the object and rightly excluded non-citizens out of international comity.55 While
some might think that it should have captured, instead, acts of citizens and non-
citizens which had consequences in Singapore, the under-inclusiveness in relation to
48 Ibid, art 12(2).
49 Ong Ah Chuan, supra note 41 at para 35.
50 Ibid at para 37.
51 Ibid at para 38.
52 Ibid.
53 [1998] 2 SLR (R) 489 at paras 78-80 (CA) [Taw Cheng Kong]. The CA adopted the principles in Lee
Keng Guan v Public Prosecutor [1975-1977] SLR 231 (CA).
54 Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed Sing [PCA].
55 Taw Cheng Kong, supra note 53 at paras 64-75.
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non-citizens was necessary in view of the need for comity, while the differentiation
along the line of citizenship was justifiably related to the objective.56
The HC in LMS (HC) reiterated that the presumption was “intimately tied to the
idea of separation of powers”.57 In the context of issues of social morality, there
should be due deference to the elected legislature which had been “entrusted with
the task of representing the people’s interests and will”.58 If there was a difference
of opinion between the legislature and the judiciary as to the appropriate differentia
or the objective of the law, the judiciary could not strike down the law for that
reason alone as long as the differentia bore a rational relation to the objective, even
if there existed more effective differentia59 or more salutary objectives. Though the
CA more tersely noted that the presumption is “logical as well as commonsensical
as our legislature is presumed not to enact legislation which is inconsistent with
the Singapore Constitution”,60 its statement should be taken as reflecting the same
understanding of the separation of powers, given its emphases on the court not being
a mini-legislature.61
Before delving into LMS/TEH, it should be noted that a distinction must be main-
tained between the classification and the objective of the law: the objective identified
by the courts should never be expressed in similar terms to the classification. For
example, the classification in s 304A of the Penal Code is of persons who cause
death by rash or negligent acts, with the former being punishable with a lengthier
term than the latter and with both being punishable less severely than in the case
of culpable homicide (s 304 of the Penal Code) and murder (s 302 of the Penal
Code). The differentiation in punishment is ostensibly related to the varying moral
culpability of the acts, whether requiring greater retribution or greater deterrence.
The differentiae in ss 302, 304, and 304A—mens rea—bear a rational relation to the
objective of the laws, which punish according to moral culpability. The objective of
s 304A should not be expressed as that of punishing those who have caused death
56 As noted in LMS (HC), supra note 10 at paras 58, 59, Tan Yock Lin had commented that less compre-
hensible is the CA’s point that even if a segment of Singapore citizens not contemplated by the Act was
captured, it did not offend the equality provision insofar as it captured all of them as a class (Taw Cheng
Kong, supra note 53 at para 82), though the finding of a rational relation between the objective and the
class is understandable: see Tan Yock Lin, “Equal Protection, Extra-Territoriality and Self-Incrimination
(1998) 19 Sing L Rev 10. The HC had concluded from the parliamentary debates that the objective
of s 37 of the PCA, the provision in question, was to address acts of corruption taking place outside
Singapore but with consequences in Singapore. As such, the classification on the basis of citizenship
was over-inclusive for catching a class of persons not contemplated as falling within the objective of
the PCA (for example, a Singapore citizen employed by a foreign government within a foreign country
whose act of corruption had no consequences in Singapore) and under-inclusive for failing to catch
a class of persons whose acts clearly fall within the mischief sought to be addressed (for example, a
foreigner working for the Singapore government who took a short trip to receive a bribe in relation to
an act which would be done in Singapore). There was thus a failure of the requisite nexus between
the classification on the basis of citizenship and the objective of the PCA: Taw Cheng Kong v Public
Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR (R) 78 at paras 64, 65 (HC). Since the CA perceived the objective differently,
as being that of widening the scope of the Act to more effectively control and suppress corruption, all
Singaporeans could be targeted for this purpose, even those whose acts did not have consequences in
Singapore.
57 LMS (HC), supra note 10 at para 110.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid at para 95.
60 LMS/TEH, supra note 9 at para 4.
61 Ibid at paras 70, 77, 82, 84, 92, 93, 101, 154, 173, 189.
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by rash or negligent acts, as such expression of the objective merely repeats the
classification chosen by the legislature, which renders the reasonable classification
test meaningless as all classification would be rationally related to objectives stated
in the terms of the differentiae. For example, in Taw Cheng Kong, the objective was
to more effectively control and prevent corruption and the width of the differentia
was understandable in view of this. The classification in s 377A is of acts of gross
indecency between males; the objective should not be expressed as that of punishing
males who commit acts of gross indecency.
The HC in LMS (HC) found the task of deciding legislative objective complicated,
as s 377A was based upon an English provision enacted in 1885, was introduced in
1938 and survived the contentious criminal law review of 2007. It decided that
the purpose in 1938 was reaffirmed by Parliament in 2007: the purpose was to
criminalise behaviour that was undesirable or unacceptable given the majority’s
moral values, according to which homosexual behaviour was not accepted, the family
was regarded as the basic building block of society, and a family meant the bringing up
of children within a one-man-one-woman marital context.62 Although the objective
was that of criminalising male homosexual behaviour because it was not acceptable
or desirable,63 such phrasing is not problematic for equating the classification with
the objective because it stipulates a reason for criminalisation, just as punishing
according to moral culpability in the case of s 304A does.
There are concerns with such an objective, though. Is it under-inclusive because
other similar unacceptable or undesirable behaviours have not been criminalised?
If one compares it with the analysis of s 304A, the enunciation is as general as the
suggestion that s 304A exists to punish morally culpable acts. Just as one does not
think of all other similarly morally culpable acts that are not criminalised and fault
the legislature for the under-inclusiveness of s 304A, s 377A is not under-inclusive
in failing to criminalise all other unacceptable or undesirable acts. However, no
such general charge is made; one is usually thinking of a narrow range of similar
behaviours, particularly non-coital sexual acts in view of the repeal of the old s 377.
Thus, the real question is: was s 377A under-inclusive for failing to criminalise gross
indecency between females or other “unnatural” sexual acts? Following Taw Cheng
Kong, the presumption of constitutionality applies for s 377A to be upheld even if
a more effective classification could be found, as long as the chosen classification
is not irrational, for example, because such acts between males are thought of as
particularly unacceptable because of distinct physiological possibilities.
This leads to the question whether the majority’s moral values finding such
behaviour especially unacceptable or undesirable may be a proper basis for leg-
islation. This inquiry concerns the legitimacy of the law’s objective. It has been
argued by Thio Su Mien based on Takahashi v Fish and Game Commissioner,64
and accepted in LMS (HC), that a classification may satisfy the reasonable relation
62 LMS (HC), supra note 10 at paras 84, 85, 146. It noted that s 377A was not enacted to preserve the
family as the basic building block of society; rather, the fact that the family was the basic building block
was simply a shared value (at para 86).
63 Ibid at para 100.
64 334 US 410 (1948).
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test and yet be invalid as the object is “inherently bad”.65 The court may look
into the legitimacy of purpose in limited circumstances when the purpose is “capri-
cious”, “absurd”, or amounts to “Wednesbury unreasonableness”.66 It is submitted
that disallowing inherently bad objectives honours the principle behind the equality
provision and the reasonable classification test. If objectives of legislation could be
inherently bad, the test would be merely formalistic. For example, a racial genocide
law singling out a particular race for the death penalty might have as its object the
wiping out of persons of Race X. The classification easily bears a rational relation
to the law’s objective, and if the court could not distinguish between inherently bad
and permissible objectives, the law would pass muster under art 12(1) if art 12(2)
was amended to remove the racial ground of protection.67 Suppose, to avoid an
inherently bad objective, the law was tweaked by a disingenuous legislature which
said its purpose was to eliminate all traitors in a wartime emergency. Two objec-
tions would arise: first, the objective might not be legitimate as it would amount to
punishment without trial; second, the classification by race would not be rationally
related to such an objective as not all persons of Race X were traitors. Thus, barring
inherently bad objectives makes it harder for manifestly unjust laws to be passed.
How does such an analysis apply in the case of s 377A?
The HC in LMS (HC) viewed s 377A as addressing a “social and public morality
concern”.68 The purpose was not illegitimate in view of the weight of historical
practices vis-à-vis male homosexual conduct that suggested a basis for those practices
within a framework of the common law regime.69 The HC noted that if a court were to
pronounce that a law that had stood for decades or centuries was wrong and ought not
to have been enacted because its bases were flawed, “a justification of proportionate
magnitude [was] invariably required”, and if this was not “evident or forthcoming”,
the matter was for Parliament to decide.70 Moreover, in the context of Singapore’s
societal mores and norms, males were traditionally involved in “carrying” the family
name, thus explaining the singling out of male homosexual acts. The HC in TEH
(HC) similarly disagreed with the argument that advancement of morality was not a
sound object, noting that Parliament may amend legislation to reflect societal norms
and values.71 This suggested the court did not distinguish between an objective
morality and societal morality and also did not question whether societal morality
was sound or motivated by animus.
While the LMS (HC) did not explicitly analyse whether the norm of societal
morality stemmed from bias or animus, the reference to a law that has stood for
decades or centuries in various jurisdictions indicates a broad historical consensus
as to a moral norm undergirding the law and would be in line with the natural law
65 LMS (HC), supra note 10 at paras 115, 116.
66 Ibid at para 116.
67 Whether such an amendment could be made depends on whether there are implied substantive limitations
on the power of amendment, for example, in the form of the basic features doctrine. Whether the basic
features doctrine enunciated in Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 is part of
Singapore law was left open in Yong Vui Kong (2015), supra note 14 at para 72.
68 LMS (HC), supra note 10 at para 117.
69 Ibid at paras 119-121.
70 Ibid at para 119.
71 TEH (HC), supra note 11 at para 94.
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interpretation of art 12 that I am propounding in this article.72 At the very least, such
reference indicates that there exists no broad historical consensus as to the injustice
of such laws, which is what is required by the approach I am proposing. Did the
HC, however, reject a natural law approach? The HC observed that in spite of the
statement regarding the word “law” in Ong Ah Chuan, for the purpose of art 12
the only relevant test for violation or compliance was the reasonable classification
test, and art 12 did not further import the requirements of natural justice.73 While
that may be so, I would note that this does not imply natural law is irrelevant in the
interpretation of art 12: the reasonable classification test is a manifestation of the
workings of natural law, which is all the more evident if one accepts the holding in
LMS (HC) that the purpose must not be inherently bad. In Part IV, I shall explicate
my proposed approach according to which the judiciary may not strike down a
law on the ground that the purpose is inherently bad unless there exists a broad
historical consensus that the norm on which the law is based is morally egregious.
Otherwise, it would be substituting its judgment about a contentious moral norm for
the legislature’s.
The CA regarded the reasonable classification test as a “threshold test”74 which
did not answer the fundamental questions pertaining to what equality required, not-
ing that Peter Westen had considered the difficulties related to the idea of equality.75
Rarely would a statute not pass muster under it, given that differentia must only be
“intelligible”, not perfect,76 and the relation to the objective need only be “rational”
and not “perfect”.77 The requirement of intelligibility should “avoid any consider-
ation of substantive moral, political and/or ethical issues” and it was “no business
of the courts or the law generally to engage in the resolution of such issues—except
to the extent necessary to resolve any legal issue(s) at hand.”78 While the CA
adopted LMS (HC)’s notion of intelligible differentia as value-neutral,79 it qualified
that something would be unintelligible if it was “so unreasonable as to be illogi-
cal and/or incoherent”, so “extreme” that “no reasonable person” would regard it
72 See Part IV of this article. Note that in the case when the legislature enacts a law, it does not have to base
it on a moral norm in relation to which there is a broad historical consensus. The approach I propose
permits the court to overturn a law only when there is a broad historical consensus as to its injustice. If,
however, the HC is of the view that laws across many jurisdictions are based on such moral views, no
broad historical consensus to the contrary exists, and the court cannot act. That would be so even though
Yap Po Jen has pointed out that some of these jurisdictions have repealed their laws (see Yap Po Jen,
“Section 377A and Equal Protection in Singapore: Back to 1938?” (2013) 25 Sing Ac LJ 630 at 638)
as the fact of repeal per se is inconclusive: the consensus must not only be across many jurisdictions,
it must have persisted for a long time and the consensus must also pertain to the reason for the repeal.
73 TEH (HC), supra note 11 at para 28.
74 LMS/TEH, supra note 9 at para 62.
75 Ibid at para 61. See Peter Westen, “The Empty Idea of Equality” (1982) 95 Harv L Rev 537; compare
with Erwin Chemerinksy, “In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen” (1983) 81 Mich L
Rev 575. The conclusions of the CA in view of the observation that equality was an empty idea was
surprising in view of Westen’s views, but more will be said later: see the text accompanying note 140
below in this article.
76 LMS/TEH, supra note 9 at para 65.
77 Ibid at para 68.
78 Ibid at para 65 [emphases in original].
79 Ibid at para 66.
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as intelligible.80 The test had substantive elements,81 but because courts were not
“mini-legislatures”,82 they could not declare a statute unconstitutional because of
illegitimacy of its object,83 as there were no legal standards, only extra-legal ones,
by which courts could judge legitimacy.84 But a “limited element of illegitimacy”85
was embodied in the reasonable classification test: in the case of “extreme illogicality
and/or incoherence”, the statute would fail the reasonable classification test in one or
both limbs.86 Notably, the CA rejected the concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness
in the context of a constitutional challenge and said that even if it were applicable,
it would not help in the present context where the arguments were extra-legal.87 As
for s 377A, it sought to enforce societal morality and was not confined to addressing
the problem of male prostitution. Thus, it did not fail the reasonable classification
test.88 Instead of pleading illegitimacy of objective, one had to mount a challenge
under art 12(2), which furnished legal criteria for alleging discrimination. Sexual
orientation was not included, but it could be amended by the legislature in view of
changing social mores.89
To what extent may legitimacy be considered under the idea of illogicality or inco-
herence rendering differentia unintelligible? On whether a law that banned women
from driving was constitutional, the CA observed that such an “extreme provision. . .
would probably not be enacted by a reasonable Parliament in the Singapore con-
text”.90 I would suggest that the CA was probably stating its prediction of Singapore
politics rather than a reason for rejecting the illegitimacy consideration, given that
constitutionalism exists to protect citizens from unreasonable legislatures, not rea-
sonable ones in relation to which a system of parliamentary supremacy would work
equally well. Thus, the CA could not have intended its statement as a reason for
rejecting the illegitimacy consideration. The CA noted, however, that the provision
might fail the second limb of the reasonable classification test unless its purpose was
to ban all women from driving, in which case the question would also arise as to
whether the differentia was illogical and/or incoherent.91 While the CA left a limited
challenge of illegitimacy under the idea of intelligible differentia open, it regarded art
12(1) as aspirational and rejected the concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness and
the determination of legitimacy of objectives. Whether these moves are problematic
is examined in the next section.
C. Legal and Extra-Legal Considerations
While the delineation of legal and extra-legal considerations was considered pri-
marily in relation to the reasonable classification test, the discussion merits separate
80 Ibid at para 67 [emphasis in original].
81 Ibid at para 71.
82 Ibid at para 77.
83 Ibid at paras 82, 83, 154.
84 Ibid at para 85.
85 Ibid at para 84 [emphasis in original].
86 Ibid at para 86 [emphasis in original].
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid at paras 138, 143, 153.
89 Ibid at paras 90-92.
90 Ibid at para 114.
91 Ibid.
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examination in view of the CA’s opening words on its role in regarding only legal
arguments. This section will introduce the jurisprudential theories considered and
examine their import for constitutional judicial review.
LMS/TEH stands out for its consideration of legal philosophy, beginning with what
it called “a central motif in the justly famous theory of adjudication proffered by the
late Prof Ronald Dworkin” that the court “must disregard extra-legal considerations
that are uniquely within the purview of the Legislature” and yet “have regard to
extra-legal considerations in so far as they impact the application of Art 9 and Art
12 themselves”92 and when “absolutely necessary to enable the court to apply the
relevant legal principles relating to Art 9 and Art 12”.93 The court should not be:
sucked into and thereby descend into the political arena, which would in turn
undermine (or even destroy) the very role which constitutes the raison d’être
for the court’s existence in the first place—namely, to furnish an independent,
neutral and objective forum for deciding on the basis of objective legal rules and
principles, (inter alia) what rights parties [had] in a given situation.94
This was imperative when arguments were “intensely controversial” and empirical
evidence was ambiguous.95
Dworkin’s theory of adjudication96 suggests that judges interpreting the law
should be cognisant of settled “rules” in cases, which apply in an all-or-nothing
fashion and set out the legal consequences when certain conditions are met, and
“principles” underlying the legal rules, which are requirements of justice, fairness
or some other dimension of morality. Where no settled legal rule dictates a deci-
sion either way, judges are to exercise discretion and decide such “hard cases” by
weighing principles which provide arguments for particular decisions, and making
decisions that they can justify by an interpretation of the law in the particular area
which can also justify other decisions they propose to make. This can be achieved if
the judge finds an interpretation of law that best fits and justifies all the precedents,
which applies to the hard case at hand and which they are prepared to employ in future
cases.97 Thus, like cases would be treated alike, having been decided by legal rules or
underlying principles. Judges should not apply “policies”, which set out goals to be
reached and generally concern improvements in some economic, political or social
features of the community and are not part of the law unless the legislature decides
to enact a statute to advance such goals (which then have limited effect in the terms
92 Ibid at para 6 [emphasis in original].
93 Ibid [emphasis in original].
94 Ibid at para 7 [emphasis in original].
95 Ibid.
96 This is set out in several books, including Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London:
Duckworth, 1977) and Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986).
97 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, ibid at ch 4. Some cases must be dismissed as “mistakes” in order
to arrive at an interpretation of law that best fits and justifies precedents, as it may not be possible to
find an interpretation that fits all precedents, or even if one does so, an interpretation that fits fewer of
the precedents may better justify the law. That said, the number and character of events that may be
disposed of as mistakes are limited, as one must be honouring the institutional history and materials.
The task is of interpreting and not creating afresh a perspective of law. See Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously, ibid at 120-123.
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of the statute).98 Adjudicating in this manner, unelected judges would not violate the
ideals of democracy because principles are part of the law, underlying specific rules,
and provide arguments for concrete pre-existing rights, while policies do not and
any policy advanced in a statute would already be honoured by the enforcement of
the statutory rule.99 Judges remain faithful to their judicial function of applying the
law, rather than making new law. While the CA did not refer directly to Dworkin’s
terminology of rules, principles and policies, but only to the exclusion of extra-legal
considerations except insofar as they impact the application of arts 9 and 12, it may
be surmised that the CA would, in a Dworkinian manner, countenance moral values
underlying constitutional provisions, which would be part of the legal institutional
morality that Dworkin suggests judges should apply in the exercise of their discre-
tion. It is therefore imperative to examine what “extra-legal considerations” or legal
institutional morality underlies the constitutional provisions.
The CA discussed four “extra-legal arguments which are clearly and wholly
outside the remit of the courts, and which fall instead within the purview of the
Legislature”, in dismissing their relevance for the reasonable classification test.100
They are: the tyranny of the majority; the argument based on the absence of harm
and societal morality not being a legitimate ground for legislation; the argument
based on immutability or intractable difficulty of change; and the safeguarding of
public health.101 The four arguments are inter-linked and revolve around the idea of
whether John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, formulated to support his idea of liberty,
is correct. I shall explain how these arguments revolve around liberty and also assess
which arguments are outside the court’s remit, given that the CA adopted Dworkin’s
theory.
1. Tyranny of the Majority, Absence of Harm, and the Enforcement of Societal
Morality
The CA recognised that the argument about the tyranny of the majority might be
grounded in the argument about the absence of harm. Relatedly, the CA noted that
the argument about the tyranny of the majority might be based on rights which trump,
a point dependent on the interpretation of art 12. The arguments raised similar issues
as the Hart-Devlin debate over the “Wolfenden Report”102.103
Hart adopted with qualification the view of Mill, in his work On Liberty, according
to which the only ground on which society may interfere with the liberty of another
was for self-protection.104 Only the prevention of harm to others may be a ground
for the coercive force of the law to be used against an individual, while his own
good, whether physical or moral, may not. An individual should not be compelled to
do or refrain from doing something because it would be better for him, he would be
98 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, ibid at 82.
99 Ibid at 81-86.
100 LMS/TEH, supra note 9 at paras 154, 155 [emphasis in original].
101 Ibid at paras 157-177.
102 UK, “The Report of the Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution”, Cmnd
247 in Sessional Papers (1957-58) [“Wolfenden Report”].
103 LMS/TEH, supra note 9 at para 162.
104 John Gray, ed, John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)
[On Liberty].
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happier, or because the majority thought it wise and right.105 The first two extra-legal
arguments are inter-linked: if the law may only step in to prevent harm to others
apart from the actor, societal morality is not a legitimate ground for legislation; the
majority is tyrannical if it restricts what the individual might have done if the law
had not been in place, or if it imposes sanctions for a violation.106
While theAttorney-General relied on Lord Devlin’s approach, according to which
public (as opposed to popular) morality could be enforced through law, the appellants
relied on the view of Hart/Mill.107 The CA said that these issues were “a matter of
jurisprudence and legal philosophy. . . [and lay] quintessentially within the sphere of
the Legislature”.108 The court could not and ought not to undertake the “balancing
of rights on a broad philosophical basis”.109 For example, the definition of “harm”
in Mill’s harm principle was contentious and to be determined by the legislature.110
The legislature as an elected body had the mandate to promulgate laws to reflect
and preserve social morality.111 Apart from pursuing their rights through arts 9 and
12, the appellants could not vindicate their rights by the argument simpliciter that
“they feel that the prevailing societal morality is wrong as it deprives them of their
freedom”.112 While the argument could be made, the appellants would “necessarily
need to bring to bear a great number of extra-legal arguments”, such as empirical
data, that were uniquely within the legislature’s purview.113
The CA’s reference to inconclusive jurisprudential debates should not be taken as
a stamp of approval that a legislature may select any philosophical principle on which
to found laws: the selected principle must be allowed by the Singapore Constitution.
If fundamental rights are at stake, the majority’s morality—for example a racially
discriminatory or Nazi morality—which derogates from such rights may not be
enforced. Where no constitutional rights were infringed, it was futile to assert a
general freedom.114
Logically, finding a constitutional right should precede the determination that
societal morality may not be enforced. The US SC, when finding a similar law
unconstitutional, said it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the US Constitution. Thus, it refused to enforce a Texas statute criminalising
105 Ibid at 14.
106 H L A Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963) at 1-22.
107 LMS/TEH, supra note 9 at paras 167, 168.
108 Ibid at para 169 [emphasis in original]. See also Chief Justice Roberts’s comment in Obergefell v
Hodges, 135 S Ct 2584 (2015) [Obergefell] that “a Justice’s commission does not confer any special
moral, philosophical, or social insight sufficient to justify imposing those perceptions on fellow citizens
under the pretense of ‘due process”’ (at 2622).
109 LMS/TEH, supra note 9 at para 169.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid at para 171.
112 Ibid at para 173 [emphasis in original].
113 Ibid [emphasis in original]. This may be correlated with the CA’s point regarding the difficulty of
resolving jurisprudential debates (see the text accompanying note 108 above). What the CA must have
meant when it said the argument could be made was that it was a viable argument on a theoretical level,
but the proper place to make such an argument was in the legislature.
114 Ibid at para 161. This was suggested by the CA’s note that the appellants might have been arguing that
societal morality should not be enforced to the detriment of individual rights, presumably under the
Constitution, since a contrast was drawn with the general arguments (at para 160) that might have been
made apart from the constitutional provisions (reiterated at para 172).
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homosexual acts. A digression to Lawrence,115 which overruled Bowers v Hard-
wick,116 shows what the CA might have been seeking to avoid: the US SC might
have been swayed by their perception of majority opinion (referring to an “emerging
awareness”) in finding that a contentious right existed. Rejecting the analysis in
Bowers that there was no fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy,
the US SC suggested that anti-sodomy laws had more far-reaching consequences
even as they prohibited only particular sexual acts, as they touched upon the most
private human conduct in the most private places and sought to control the right of
homosexuals to enter into personal relationships which were within the liberty of
persons to choose. Intimate conduct as an overt expression of sexuality was but one
element in a personal bond that was more enduring, which homosexuals had a right
to choose under the US Constitution.117 Justice Scalia, dissenting, criticised this,
noting that there was “no right to ‘liberty’ under the Due Process Clause, though
[the majority] repeatedly [made] that claim.”118 While the doctrine of substantive
due process had been applied in the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it prohibited states from infringing fundamental liberty interests, which were rights
“deeply rooted in [the] Nation’s history and tradition”, unless the infringement was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.119 Where liberty interests
unsupported by history and tradition were circumscribed by state laws, state laws
only had to be rationally related to legitimate state interests.120 Justice Scalia criti-
cised the majority’s view that there was “an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives
in matters pertaining to sex”, noting on the contrary that states prosecuted many sex-
related crimes.121 Justice Scalia further objected to the majority’s finding that there
was no legitimate state interest served by the Texas statute, when it sought to further
the belief of citizens that certain sexual behaviour were immoral and unacceptable—
the “same [state] interest furthered by laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery,
adult incest, bestiality and obscenity”.122
How did the judges in the majority determine that such a right to choose the most
intimate bonds existed? And how did they determine that societal morality could not
constitute a legitimate state interest? It might have been a result of their view as to the
importance of sexual liberty.123 The importance of sexual liberty has been advocated
by philosophers such as Hart. Jeffrie Murphy notes that Hart might have wanted to
protect the freedom of homosexual relations between consenting adults when he
emphasised the difficulty of suppression of sexual impulses and thus the importance
115 Lawrence, supra note 6.
116 478 US 186 (1986) [Bowers].
117 Lawrence, supra note 6 at 567.
118 Ibid at 592.
119 Ibid at 593.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid at 572, 597, 598 [emphasis in original].
122 Ibid at 599.
123 Rather than defend sexual freedom on the grounds of privacy or equality, Bamforth and Richards have
relied on the idea of a moral right to autonomy, relying on Duff’s idea that “respect for a person as
an autonomous subject requires respect for their integrity as a sexual agent”: Nicholas C Bamforth &
David A J Richards, Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of Natural Law (USA:
Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 212, 213. According to such a view, the lack of consent of the
other party might be the only ground for restricting the agent’s sexual freedom.
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of sexual liberty in the claim of protection from the state’s coercive interference.124
If this general idea is what the majority in Lawrence relied upon, it preferred its
own, over the Legislature’s, resolution of a contentious philosophical debate; it is
debatable whether it truly found any right within the US Constitution. Murphy notes
it is unlikely that Hart would have offered the same protection to those with a taste
for necrophilia.125 Murphy opines, drawing upon Justice Kennedy’s judgment in
Lawrence,126 that homosexual sex is protected as it is part of forming an intimate
personal bond with another adult human being—an element absent in sex with a
“corpse or animal or child”.127 But Murphy’s defence of homosexual liberty on this
distinction is problematic.
First, Murphy offers no reason why an intimate personal bond is intrinsically
worthy. If it is based on majority opinion, majority opinion becomes the basis
of fundamental rights—a conclusion Hart and advocates of fundamental rights for
homosexual intimacy cannot consistently accept, as they deny that majority opinion
is sufficient for circumscribing rights. Where a majority fails to recognise a right,
it follows liberty might be constrained. The absence of majority opinion as to the
worthiness of postmortem bonds, especially (arguendo) that which someone in their
lifetime consented to and requested believing this would continue a precious per-
sonal bond—even at death, they do not part!—can be used to justify the criminal
prohibition of necrophilia.128 Murphy claims that:
If the liberty to do something is not very important (as the liberty to have sex
with human bodies clearly is not) then arguably reasonable beliefs about the
sacredness or dignity of the human body could justify curtailment of this liberty
without showing disrespect to those who would like to exercise such a liberty.
However, if the liberty is of considerable importance (as Justice Kennedy has
argued is the case with sexual relations between homosexuals), then arguments
that such relations disrespect the sacredness or dignity of the human body—even
if arguably reasonable and not merely expressions of thoughtless disgust—would
not be sufficient to justify criminalization.129
Murphy fails to explain how one may determine that “the liberty to have sex with
human bodies clearly is not” very important, while homosexual relations are.
The second question Murphy must answer is the basis on which necrophilia, but
not homosexuality, is regarded as “psychopathology”.130 The classification shows
what is at stake in the Hart-Devlin debate: as laws should not criminalise what is
intrinsically good, what acts are intrinsically good?131 Fundamental rights exist to
124 Jeffrie G Murphy, “A Failed Refutation and an Insufficiently Developed Insight in Hart’s Law, Liberty,
and Morality” (2013) 7 Crim Law and Philos 419 at 424.
125 Ibid at 425, 426.
126 Lawrence, supra note 6 at 567.
127 Murphy, supra note 124 at 429.
128 Though Murphy is not necessarily in favour of such legislation, he considers it for the sake of argument
as to what might count as good reasons: ibid at 430.
129 Ibid at 432.
130 Ibid at 430.
131 See eg, Richard J Arneson, “The Enforcement of Morals Revisited” (2013) 7 Crim Law and Philos 435
at 445.
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protect intrinsic goods. Some Rawlsian liberals who argue for the priority of the
right over the good claim they do not settle the question of what is good, and may
decide on rights, using John Rawls’s public reason. Murphy, for example, attempts
to show he does not rely on brute majority opinion (or animus), but on “democratic
politics” and a qualified Rawlsian public reason test,132 according to which majority
opinion may have effect if it has given weight to all reasonable arguments, pro and
con.133 If majority opinion relies on “conceptions of sin that rest solely on matters of
religious sectorial dogma”, they fail to respect the reasonable views of all citizens.134
Rawls endeavours to order a pluralistic society by a political conception of justice,
which is worked out for a limited object of having a basic structure of government,
rather than any citizen’s comprehensive doctrine which addresses what is of value
in human life.135 As the analysis of homosexuality and necrophilia shows, however,
a fundamental right to engage in one but not the other is hard to explain without
resolving the question of the intrinsic goodness (or lack thereof) of either act.136 If
majority opinion is based on the unworthiness of acts of necrophilia, it is based on a
particular conception of the good, which is prohibited by Rawlsian public reason.
The upshot is that the US SC read into the US Constitution a right to enter into
personal relationships, which included the right to homosexual practices. Societal
morality could not be enforced in violation of such a right, unless there was a legiti-
mate state interest. In its view, none existed. In contrast, the CA did not think there
was a similar right, and given that no rights were violated, it was not its place to take
one side in the Hart-Devlin debate when the legislature had taken the opposite side:
the considerations of the Hart-Devlin debate were “extra-legal” because they did not
feature in the delineation of the constitutional right in question.
Consider, however, a hypothetical case: a legislature removes the art 12(2) ground
of race137 and decides to enforce Nazi (societal) morality by exterminating Jews.
The court should only say that the legislature has the mandate to choose one side
in the Hart-Devlin debate and enforce societal morality if no constitutional right
was at stake. Are arts 9(1) or 12(1) violated? For art 9(1), it would depend on
whether “law” is given a natural law reading. As noted,138 one hopes that the CA
did not generally reject the requirement that the law not be absurd or arbitrary, but
only found that absurdity and arbitrariness had not been made out in LMS/TEH. A
natural law interpretation requires that absurdity and arbitrariness be determined by
an objective morality, and I propose in Part IV that the judiciary may only find a law
unconstitutional according to Radbruch’s formula. For art 12(1), it would depend
on whether, in view of the rejection of the consideration of legitimacy of objectives,
illogicality or incoherence is established such that the first limb of the reasonable
classification test is not satisfied. The criterion of Wednesbury unreasonableness
has also been rejected, at least in LMS/TEH where all the arguments made under
132 Murphy’s qualifications are not relevant for our purposes: see Murphy, supra note 124 at 431.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) at 140, 175, 176.
136 See eg, Robert P George, In Defense of Natural Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 217,
218, where George explains the “deeper moral and metaphysical questions” that are implicated, albeit
in a different context of marriage.
137 But see note 67 above.
138 See the text accompanying note 34 above.
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it were thought of as extra-legal, and the CA required that challenges be made on
the grounds in art 12(2). However, its brief consideration of the female driving
ban hypothetical example leaves open the possibility of a challenge outside of art
12(2). The approach I propose in Part IV circumscribes more restrictively than the
concept of Wednesbury reasonableness the principles on which the court may find
unconstitutionality, and goes some way to addressing the CA’s likely concern with
potentially boundless judicial activism if the court is permitted, without more, to
determine whether objectives are legitimate or unreasonable. When the CA referred
to Westen’s view that equality was an empty idea, it unfortunately went on to conclude
that art 12(1) was merely aspirational and the reasonable classification test was readily
satisfied. It is problematic if moral considerations are not relevant to the consideration
of the first limb of the reasonable classification test and the legitimacy of the objective
may not be considered. Moral considerations are “extra-legal” (within the CA’s
typology) but should not be dismissed because they are necessarily implicated in
the consideration of equality under art 12(1). Equality is empty of content without a
higher moral law, as the true question is what similarity or difference between persons
is “morally significant”,139 and what the appropriate treatment is for a class singled
out by the law. Referring to natural law in interpreting the reasonable classification
test is in fact unavoidable for the test to be meaningful: one must understand what
rights are fundamental and what treatment is just if equality is derivative of, or
logically posterior to, rights.140 If, for example, the argument against s 377Ais that an
individual has a right to make decisions affecting his own destiny and choose sexual
intimacy as he pleases, metaphysical questions about human nature are implicated as
to whether there exists a fundamental human right to sexual intimacy or whether, on
the contrary, a higher moral law determines that certain sexual acts are egregious. If
there exists no broad historical consensus for such fundamental rights, the law stands
to give effect to legislative mandate. If, on the other hand, there exists such consensus
in relation to racial discrimination, a manifestly unjust law ordering racial genocide
falls because societal morality may not be enforced in violation of fundamental rights.
2. Is Sexual Orientation Biologically Determined?
The third argument considered by the CA was that if sexual orientation was bio-
logically determined, homosexuals ought not to be discriminated against. The CA
suggested this was “primarily a scientific and extra-legal argument” outside the CA’s
purview:141 there was no definitive evidence on whether sexual orientation was bio-
logically determined. One should note that this argument, while based on an assertion
of scientific fact, is a philosophical or moral argument.142 It builds upon the first two
139 Peter Westen, “The Empty Idea of Equality”, supra note 75 at 573.
140 Ibid at 548-556.
141 LMS/TEH, supra note 9 at para 176 [emphasis in original].
142 The identification of the nature of the argument is not trivial as a number of other arguments in the context
of law are of this nature. For example, the argument that the unborn has personhood and abortion should
be prohibited is a philosophical argument that is based upon scientific fact. Science informs us about the
processes of foetal development and the unique genetic composition of the foetus. But it is philosophy
that develops the argument about the rights that the unborn ought to have, based upon similarities with
the newborn and the rights the newborn is taken to have.
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by bolstering the suggestion that, if immutability or difficulty of change is a scien-
tific fact, s 377A is oppressive.143 The third argument, strictly, is not dependent on
Mill’s principle for legislation. Even if the prevention of harm is not the only ground
for restrictive legislation and even if the enforcement of morality is permissible, the
third argument suggests that there are no good reasons for such legislation. It is not
morally relativistic. While the first two arguments, if they are based on morality,
might be based on the idea that the autonomy of the individual on moral matters is
supreme, which might suggest that there is no moral law over individuals,144 the
third involves a positive moral assertion that it is morally abhorrent to criminalise
homosexual acts, given that homosexuals are not desirous of engaging in them, over
heterosexual acts, by choice.
Understanding the nature of the third argument helps us to make sense of the CA’s
decision. The CA was content to say that the scientific fact asserted is not proven
and the argument should be addressed by the legislature. What, exactly, should
be addressed by the legislature? There are two possibilities. First, it was for the
legislature to decide whether sexual orientation was biologically determined. This
is unlikely, as what was in issue was a biological question. Second, in the absence of
conclusive evidence, the legislature could decide whether it would act on the basis
that homosexuality was or was not biologically determined. This is more likely.
The difficult issue, however, is whether the courts would be allowed to determine
that a legislature has decided unreasonably, in the case of other factual questions for
which uncontroverted conclusions are available to the contrary. The CA’s approach
does not preclude that: arguably, “scientific and extra-legal” arguments were outside
its purview in the particular context of arguments for which there was no definitive
evidence either way. TEH (HC) is clearer on this: it had similarly concluded that
medical and scientific evidence was divided and inconclusive, but instead of saying
that scientific arguments were outside its purview, said that Tan Eng Hong had not
established his factual assertion that homosexuality was a natural and immutable trait.
By TEH (HC)’s approach, a law is open to challenge if its discriminatory treatment
is based upon an assertion of scientific fact which prevailing thought suggests is
untrue.
143 Some take the view that even if sexual orientation is innate and immutable, and even if someone is
not morally culpable for having a particular lifestyle or orientation, laws and public decision may still
work to discourage the acts in question. For example, Wolfe has made the argument by analogy with
alcoholism: see Christopher Wolfe, “Homosexuality in American Public Life” in Christopher Wolfe,
ed, Same Sex Matters: The Challenge of Homosexuality (Dallas: Spence Publishing Company, 2000)
at 5.
144 This is a highly tenuous position. First, if there is no moral law over individuals, all individuals are
worthless because any individual may do anything to someone else. If, however, individuals may
exercise their autonomy insofar as they do not harm others, there is a moral law over all individuals,
which stipulates, for example, that another has physical integrity. Someone who asserts the primacy
of autonomy must accept qualifications to that primacy in the form of a moral law and give up their
non-cognitivism. But once this is conceded, what are the origins and content of such moral law, and on
what basis does one claim that the moral law stops at norms such as the prohibition of physical harm
to others? These are questions to be answered but will have to be left to another article. Second, an
argument that is ultimately based on the violation of the principle of equality is a moral argument: see eg,
Robert R Reilly, Making Gay Okay: How Rationalizing Homosexual Behavior is Changing Everything
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2014) at 104.
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3. The Safeguarding of Public Health
The fourth argument seeks to demolish the case that s 377A is necessary for the
safeguarding of public health: if the case is made out, there would exist a public
policy reason, apart from the enforcement of morality, for s 377A; the first two
arguments would not avail the appellants if s 377A is not, in the first place, for the
purpose of enforcing morality.
The CAnoted that theAttorney-General did not rely on this argument in the appeal.
The CA said it was “not in a position to arrive at a conclusive determination in this
particular regard” given that the argument raised extra-legal (medical and scientific)
issues and should be addressed by the legislature.145 One might again restrict the
CA’s refusal to consider extra-legal issues to the context when it was controversial
whether the section aided or hindered the objective, as legislative decision could
reasonably go either way in such an instance.
IV. Calibrating Judicial Review
I suggested in Part III that constitutional judicial review should be conducted in
line with natural law theory. Does this open the doors for an activist judiciary to
disregard, and encroach upon, the legislature’s mandate to make laws?
The higher law in the natural law tradition is a moral law. While natural law
theory suggests that law and morality are necessarily connected, not all morals must
be legislated. Still, the enforcement of morals through law would be acceptable to
a natural law theorist.146 A reference to a higher law is not to be conflated with
the US SC’s reference to what liberty entails in substantive due process,147 which
can in fact be the antithesis of natural law theory. The US SC in Lawrence did not
cite natural law theory, but instead reiterated that the enforcement of morals was not
a legitimate state interest. The majority opinion emphasised that liberty protected
persons from “unwarranted governmental intrusions into a dwelling or other private
places” and presumed “an autonomy of self that [included] freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”148 The Court rejected legislation
against private consensual conduct on the ground of morals, reiterating the statement
in Planned Parenthood v Casey149 that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life”.150 It dismissed what it called “sweeping references” by Chief Justice
Burger in Bowers “to the history of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian
145 LMS/TEH, supra note 9 at para 177 [emphasis omitted].
146 While legal moralism is famously associated with Devlin’s thesis in the Hart-Devlin debate (Hart, Law,
Liberty and Morality, supra note 106 and Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford
University Press, 1965)), there are other arguments for the enforcement of morals apart from Devlin’s.
George, for example, offers other perspectives on why a society may legitimately enforce morals. See
Robert P George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1995). In particular, Devlin is not a natural law theorist as he ostensibly subscribes to non-cognitivism
and moral relativism.
147 Murphy refers to this as the “process of adding new liberties”: Murphy, supra note 124 at 427.
148 Lawrence, supra note 6 at 562.
149 505 US 833 (1992).
150 Lawrence, supra note 6 at 574.
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moral and ethical standards”.151 The majority opinion may be contrasted with Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Lawrence which suggests that offences based on morals would no
longer be sustainable in light of the overruling of Bowers.152 Instead of referring to
objective moral norms, substantive due process emphasises the primacy of autonomy
of the individual.
Reading “natural law” into arts 9 and 12, contrary to the concern expressed in
Yong Vui Kong (2015),153 does not lend to the ideological preferences of the US
SC. In Yong Vui Kong (2015), the appellant had argued that a prohibition against
torture and inhuman punishment (including caning) should be read into the Singapore
Constitution because such practices violated the “first principles of natural law”.154
The CA held:
[W]here a right cannot be found in the Constitution (whether expressly or by
necessary implication), the courts do not have the power to create such a right
out of whole cloth simply because they consider it to be desirable or perhaps to
put in terms that might appear more principled, to be part of natural law. We note
that even among natural law theorists, there is no consensus on what natural law
requires of judges. Some have contended that natural law in fact requires judges
to respect the boundaries of authority conferred upon them by the Constitution.155
The CA quoted Robert George’s view that a natural law theorist such as himself
can reject “what Black denounced as ‘the natural law due process philosophy’ of
judging”.156 Problematically, Black used the phrase “natural law” in referring to
the substantive due process philosophy of the US SC. That philosophy is in fact
contrary to the natural law tradition affirmed by philosophers such as John Finnis and
George.157 As George himself wrote at the start of the quoted article (in a sentence
not cited by the CA): “the ‘natural law due process philosophy’ that Black rejects has
no necessary connection to the ‘natural law’ I affirm”.158 Indeed, George goes on to
explain that Black would not deny the natural law principles incorporated into the US
151 Ibid at 572.
152 Ibid at 590.
153 Yong Vui Kong (2015), supra note 14.
154 Ibid at para 68.
155 Ibid at para 73 [emphasis in original].
156 Ibid.
157 Bamforth and Richards have criticised the new natural law theorists for their conclusion as to the
moral prohibition of homosexual acts based ostensibly on self-evident basic human goods and human
fulfilment. They have argued that new natural law is not really secular: see Bamforth & Richards, supra
note 123 at ch 4. Their arguments are not explored in this article. In view of the challenge against
new natural law, the point ought to be made that the approach to constitutional judicial review based
on Radbruch’s formula proposed in this article relies more generally on law’s necessary connection
with morality, however, and seeks to distinguish the occasions when judges may find that laws are
unconstitutional from those when they may not. This relies particularly on a distinction between
a natural law view relying on objective moral norms (albeit imperfectly discerned through a broad
historical consensus) and the general idea of liberty relying on the primacy of autonomy. The method
of challenging the tenability of the latter, in comparison with the former, is purely dialectical: it probes,
for example, the source of the moral norm of autonomy and the argument for its primacy.
158 Robert P George, “The Natural Law Due Process Philosophy” (2001) 69 Fordham L Rev 2301 at 2301,
2302.
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Constitution by the framers.159 Further, George points out in the passage cited160 by
the CA that natural law requires of judges in “a basically just regime” to respect the
limits of authority settled by the constitution.161 One senses the apprehension of the
CA towards (what has been wrongly called) natural law theory when it said—one
senses, with approval—that there is nonetheless a remnant of good sense: “[s]ome
[natural law theorists] have contended” that judges should respect the boundaries
of authority in a by and large just constitutional supremacy.162 I should add that
one can expect all natural law theorists who are also moral realists, who believe
in the existence of an objective moral law, to reject the substantive due process
jurisprudence of the US SC, which is the antithesis of natural law theory. While
more than one system of government might be chosen consistently with natural law
theory, it is reasonable that where constitutionalism, with its separation of powers,
has been adopted, representative legislative mandate should generally prevail over
judicial opinion on contentious moral norms. When objective morality is not clear
on a matter, a deliberative representative democracy can take a stand through its
legislature.
A question remains, however, as to the precise scope of constitutional judicial
review if such higher law is invoked. I suggest in the first section that Radbruch’s
formula provides a check against the rise of a juristocracy, whilst allowing a natural
law approach to constitutional interpretation. Where a higher law incorporated by
arts 9 and 12 and upon which they are based is thought to have been violated, the
presumption of constitutionality should operate in favour of upholding legislation
unless the threshold of injustice in Radbruch’s formula is met. In the second section,
I explain why the adoption of Radbruch’s formula is not illegitimate in the face of
a written constitution that has not explicitly adopted it and is in fact consistent with
constitutionalism.
A. Application of Radbruch’s Formula in Constitutional Judicial Review
According to Radbruch’s formula, advocated after Radbruch’s experience of Nazi
atrocities, positive law takes precedence even when its content is unjust, unless
the conflict between the statute and justice reaches an intolerable degree. In the
case of manifestly unjust laws, the demands of legal certainty (assured through the
upholding of laws) must yield to the needs of justice. Alexy’s consideration of
Radbruch’s formula is particularly helpful. He argues that there are good reasons for
a judge to regard an extremely unjust norm as having no legal character and reject the
positivistic view that legal validity is not necessarily dependent on justice.163 Alexy
acknowledges that a basic non-relativistic ethics is presupposed by the formula,
but is of the view that the work of centuries demonstrates such broad consensus
in the declaration of human and civil rights that only with much scepticism can
one harbour doubts about the existence of basic moral norms. Conceptually, Alexy
concedes that historical experience and the existence of broad consensus do not
159 Ibid at 2302.
160 This is a passage I also cite in Tan, “Constitutional Jurisprudence”, supra note 39 at 95.
161 Yong Vui Kong (2015), supra note 14 at para 73 [emphasis in original].
162 Ibid.
163 Alexy, supra note 15 at 40-62.
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refute relativism. Nevertheless, the consensus about what amounts to injustice to an
intolerable degree ensures that a judge applying Radbruch’s formula in good faith
and having to find broad historical consensus would generally not be able to use it
to strike down just statutes for their failure to comply with perverse local moralities
such as Nazi morality.164 Judges have to demonstrate the content of the higher law
by reference to broad historical consensus. For example, in the event that racial
discrimination is not specifically proscribed by the constitution and the equality of
persons of all races is not constitutionally protected, should the legislature enact a
statute that puts persons to death on the ground of race alone, Radbruch’s formula
can be invoked to strike down the law because of the broad historical consensus
against racial genocide. Another clear instance in which it can be invoked is when a
statute authorises slavery. These examples may coincide with what is proscribed by
the peremptory norms of international law because, arguably, a necessary though not
sufficient condition for the emergence of peremptory norms would be the existence
of broad historical consensus.
The reference to peremptory norms of international law is undertaken to dis-
cern the broad historical consensus about morality—in particular, manifest injustice.
When Radbruch’s formula is invoked in constitutional judicial review, peremptory
norms are not being directly incorporated by Radbruch’s formula into domestic law.
Thus, even if Singapore adopts dualism over monism165 in relation to the interac-
tion between domestic law and international law and even if it does so with respect
to peremptory norms, this does not bar the reference to broad historical consensus.
It might be argued that this would be to allow by the backdoor, via Radbruch’s
formula, what the CA refused to countenance in Yong Vui Kong (2015). It is sub-
mitted, however, that as norms of manifest injustice under Radbruch’s formula and
peremptory norms are not congruent sets, in principle the objection should not apply.
They are not congruent sets for two reasons. First, peremptory norms could concern
something outside domestic law and pertain to inter-state relations. More crucially,
broad historical consensus could exist in relation to moral norms that have not quite
acquired peremptory status in international law. Where the incorporation of peremp-
tory norms are concerned, there may be good reasons why domestic laws should
take precedence,166 or that international law and domestic law should be regarded as
separate legal systems. These positions and the view that broad historical consensus
as to manifest injustice should not be deviated from domestically are not mutually
exclusive. While peremptory norms within a dualistic framework may be rooted
in the conscience of mankind but regarded as essential to the life of the interna-
tional, rather than the local, community,167 the idea that (domestic) laws may not be
manifestly unjust is rooted in the definition (that is, the concept or theory) of law.
In contrast to the situation involving a law that is manifestly unjust according
to broad historical consensus, judges in Roe v Wade should not have struck down
restrictive abortion laws by invoking Radbruch’s formula on the ground that they
were manifestly unjust, even if judges thought that it was not unreasonable for a
164 Ibid at 53-55.
165 Public Prosecutor v Tan Cheng Yew [2013] 1 SLR 1095 (HC), followed in Yong Vui Kong (2015), supra
note 14 at para 29.
166 This question is not considered in this article.
167 Yong Vui Kong (2015), supra note 14 at para 36.
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woman to insist she had a right to control her own body or that restrictive abortion laws
were unreasonable. To strike down laws using Radbruch’s formula, they would have
had to find broad historical consensus in 1973 that suggested that it was manifestly
unjust for a woman to be restricted from undergoing abortion. To allow judges to
strike down laws on a lesser threshold than Radbruch’s formula involves letting them
substitute their judgment for the elected legislature’s in a manner that amounts to
usurpation of legislative authority. This view does not prevent the elected legislature
from repealing such laws.
Likewise, judges cannot at this present time invoke Radbruch’s formula to strike
down, for example, s 12 of the Women’s Charter168 for regarding a marriage solem-
nised between persons of the same gender as void. While more and more jurisdictions
have approved of same sex marriage or civil partnerships, there is no broad historical
consensus that to deny same sex couples such benefits is manifestly unjust.169 The
limit of Radbruch’s formula means that the court should not do as the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court did in Goodridge v Department of Public Health170 or as
the US SC did in United States v Windsor171 or Obergefell.172 In Obergefell, there
was, in favour of the advocates for same sex marriage, “‘extensive litigation,’ ‘many
thoughtful District Court decisions,’ ‘countless studies, papers, books, and other
popular and scholarly writings,’ and ‘more than 100’ amicus briefs in these cases
alone”.173 These would still not be sufficient to constitute the broad historical con-
sensus as the opinions in favour of same sex marriage are located within a short
span of time. The requirement of broad historical consensus makes perfect sense
because if the evidence constituting an argument for striking down a law is indeed so
overwhelming but localised and current, the argument should be made through the
legislative process in a representative democracy, otherwise the decision would be
essentially made by a bare majority of an “unaccountable and unelected”174 court.
Radbruch’s formula facilitates meaningful constitutional judicial review with inbuilt
restraints on judicial power. But what if the trend of accepting same sex marriages
and civil partnerships persists in more and more jurisdictions? Could Radbruch’s
formula be invoked decades on? This is the catch to natural law theorists who sub-
scribe to Radbruch’s formula while opposing same sex marriage. While some new
natural law theorists do not accept Radbruch’s formula but treat the maxim lex injusta
non est lex as a subordinate theorem of natural law,175 the possibility of Radbruch’s
formula being invoked in a scenario like that in Goodridge or Obergefell would be
168 Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed Sing.
169 This may be inferred from the fact that until recent decades, laws criminalising homosexual acts existed
in various jurisdictions. For the evolution of the same sex marriage debate in various jurisdictions, see
eg, William N Eskridge, Jr & Darren R Spedale, Gay Marriage: For Better or For Worse? (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006).
170 798 NE (2d) 941 (Mass 2003) [Goodridge].
171 133 S Ct 2675 (2013) [Windsor]. No broad historical consensus existed that same sex marriage must
be recognised. Indeed, as Justice Scalia noted, the view that marriage excluded same sex couples “had
been unquestioned in virtually all societies for virtually all of human history” (at 2709).
172 Obergefell, supra note 108. Chief Justice Roberts referred to marriage as “an unvarying social institution
enduring over all of recorded history” (see his dissent in Obergefell, supra note 108 at 2622).
173 Ibid at 2624 (Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent).
174 Ibid. See also Justice Scalia’s dissent, noting that the people have been robbed of “the most important
liberty. . . the freedom to govern themselves” (ibid at 2627).
175 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at 351-368.
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of especial concern to a natural law theorist who accepts Radbruch’s formula but
opposes same sex marriage. Practically, it might mean that jurisdictions in which
legislatures have chosen against same sex marriage might not be able to resist a
worldwide trend many decades on if judges applied Radbruch’s formula.
While Radbruch’s formula enables resistance of Nazi-type laws by a judiciary,
it also possibly facilitates the overturning of legislatively enacted laws predicated
on objective moral norms contrary to norms in relation to which broad historical
consensus exists. Exceptionally, the latter norms may be challenged if they are found,
for example by a process of logical reasoning, to be the antithesis of objective moral
norms, such as when they are in fact based on moral scepticism. Radbruch’s formula
is conceptually not predicated on agnosticism as to the soundness of moral norms,
but is justifiable if there exists, not just a non-relativistic morality but, an objective
morality as endorsed by moral realists. Moral realists are of the view that moral facts
and properties exist and that a statement about the rightness or wrongness of an act
is neither a mere opinion nor a statement about one’s sentiments.176 If Radbruch’s
formula is to be applied in constitutional judicial review by an unelected judiciary,
however, prudentially, to guard against judges instituting their possibly idiosyncratic
personal ideologies by striking down laws based on moral norms they do not agree
with, requiring reference to broad historical consensus generally provides a good
check on judges. Conceptually, broad historical consensus may not accurately reflect
objective morals: certainly, it is not conflated with objective morals. Deciphering the
content of objective morality by reference to broad historical consensus is imperfectly
based on an egalitarian assumption that, if objective morals exist, grassroots morality
within deliberative democracies can approximate it and over time, broad historical
consensus would converge on the content of such morals.
The reference does not present us with problems in all situations in which consen-
sus on what is manifestly unjust is flawed. For example, it may be that international
consensus has been “wrong” on moral norms—at least from the point of view of
later communities. The longstanding historical approval of slavery is contrary to the
current view of slavery. During the time when slavery was acceptable, Radbruch’s
formula was ineffective rather than problematic in redressing wrongs, as there was
no broad historical consensus against slavery that a judge might have relied on. But
this means that the overturning of local laws where there is a lack of broad historical
consensus on manifest injustice should be legislatively achieved. If broad historical
consensus fails us, we do no better by counting on a juristocracy to protect us. Moral
realists would be most concerned with cases where broad historical consensus has
in their view gone dreadfully wrong but the legislature purports to do right locally.
Radbruch’s formula lends to a situation in which all have to live with the views
of the times in a world gone dreadfully wrong, allowing no local deviation from
historically and broadly prevailing wrong views, unless those views also happen to
be demonstrably based on the antithesis of objective morals. This is a true instance
when Radbruch’s formula is problematic and not merely ineffective.
The upside of Radbruch’s formula in a constitutional supremacy is that it provides
a better counter-majoritarian check given that wrongs that are done through the law
are often done by an elected representative government against some of its own
176 Robert Audi, ed, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2d ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999) at 588, 589.
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citizens: Radbruch’s formula allows such wrongs to be righted by the judiciary. The
downside is that a nation which wishes to resist an unjust worldwide and historical
trend, if indeed the world comes to such a stage, through laws enacted by its elected
representative government will find it hard to do so.
There is a further complication in the development of the broad historical con-
sensus that is linked precisely to the existence of judicial oligarchies. If legislatively
enacted laws are constantly overridden by judicial oligarchies, in view of how laws
shape societal morality,177 judges are becoming more instrumental than elected rep-
resentatives in shaping collective worldwide societal consensus.178 Over time, the
broad historical consensus that develops in a world full of judicial oligarchies might
reflect the views of select groups of judges. In such a scenario, Radbruch’s for-
mula sadly cannot be constrained by a proper broad historical consensus that is truly
representative of grassroots morality.
Should Radbruch’s formula be accepted if there is a potential downside? To
answer this question, one has to examine the alternatives. An alternative to allowing
laws to be struck down if they are manifestly unjust is to allow them to be struck
down as long as they are unjust, even if not manifestly so. This lends to temerity
on the part of unelected judges who do not have the people’s mandate. A second
alternative is to adopt legal positivism and let an autocrat (in a totalitarian state), a
few oligarchs (in an oligarchy), or the majority (in a representative democracy) have
their say through the legislature without a judicial check. How would an autocrat, a
few oligarchs, or even a brute majority better secure justice than judges acting on their
views as to what broad historical consensus on what is manifestly unjust suggests?
In the real world, we are left to choose between, on the one hand, the problems of
uncertainty associated with the determination of what is manifestly unjust and of
judges acting in bad faith despite the limits of Radbruch’s formula; and on the other
hand, the problems associated with the view that laws have no necessary connection
with morality.
B. Legitimacy of Radbruch’s Formula in the Context of Constitutionalism
What is the justification for Radbruch’s formula in the context of constitutional-
ism? In the event that a constitution outrightly contradicts Radbruch’s formula, for
example, by singling out persons of a particular race as not human and therefore
rightfully enslaved or subject to racial genocide, can Radbruch’s formula override
such a provision; and if so, would this not straightforwardly suggest its illegitimacy
when compared with a constitution which has been accepted by a nation?
Constitutional supremacy is most soundly predicated on the principle of equal
moral worth—a principle central to natural law theory.179 In turn, Radbruch’s
formula is a specific tenet of natural law theory which is applied by judges in constitu-
tional review. Constitutional provisions such as arts 9 and 12 may legitimately import
177 See eg, Leslie Green, “Should Law Improve Morality?” (2013) 7 Crim Law and Philos 473 at 479-486.
178 For example, when the US SC decided Obergefell, supra note 108, only the voters and legislators in 11
States and the District of Columbia had changed the definition of marriage to include same sex couples
(see Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent at 2615).
179 See eg, Christopher Wolfe, Natural Law Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
at 185-187, 192, 193.
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a higher law (including Radbruch’s formula). But even when they are amended to
preclude protection of a particular race so that racial genocide may be ordered by leg-
islation, such legislation as well as the constitutional amendments would constitute
manifestly unjust laws that should be struck down by Radbruch’s formula because
they violate the principle of equal moral worth on which constitutionalism is most
soundly premised.
In what sense is constitutionalism most soundly premised on equal moral worth
of all? The very idea that a constitution has the legitimacy that Radbruch’s formula
lacks, if not incorporated in it, tends to be based on the acceptance of the constitution
by all, whether by ratification (in the early days of a constitutional supremacy, through
a referendum, for example) or acquiescence.180 Basing legitimacy of a constitution
on acceptance by the people, however, is based on a belief as to the equal dignity181 of
all persons, which is precisely what Radbruch’s formula secures. Radbruch’s formula
also better secures the protection of the equal dignity of all persons than a constitution
which has been amended to approve of racial discrimination by a majority. Even
though a special majority vote in a national referendum may be recognised as a mode
for constitutional amendment, it should be observed that a majority vote, as opposed
to unanimous assent, is on principle chosen as sufficient for legitimacy often only as
a second best option as unanimity is unlikely to be achieved. Basing decisions on
majority vote, instead of unanimous assent, does not ipso facto on principle detract
from the equal moral worth of the minority. But if the view that all persons have
equal moral worth is the basis for giving any significance to majority vote, then
majority vote must not sanction a constitutional norm that violates the equal moral
worth of all. Radbruch’s formula ensures precisely this.
V. Conclusion
The CA tried its best to negotiate its way in extremely difficult terrain in LMS/TEH,
avoiding being a “mini-legislature” whilst taking seriously its role in constitutional
judicial review. Its attitude is commendable, perhaps especially so in what some
might perceive to be a time of judicial excesses in other jurisdictions. By its approach,
it clearly avoids an “exalted conception”182 of itself and instituting a juristocracy.
Unfortunately, it also takes an overly sanguine attitude towards future legislatures
doing what is right or acting in good faith, a point that is borne out in its own words
that “an extreme provision. . . would probably not be enacted by a reasonable Par-
liament in the Singapore context.”183 While that may turn out to be actually true,
the adoption of constitutionalism arguably serves precisely to protect subjects of the
180 Those arguing for the legitimacy of the constitution have not suggested that a constitution is legitimate
as long as it is approved by a majority race, for example, because the minority race is really sub-human.
But if such an argument is raised, then the burden is on those who raise it to explain how there are
rationally and morally significant differences between persons of the majority race and those of the
minority race that one should be counted as human while the other would not.
181 Some are of the view that “dignity” can appear to be an empty concept that adds nothing to other
concepts needed to flesh it out, such as autonomy. See eg, Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and
Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
182 This was the critique of the US SC by Justice Scalia in Windsor, supra note 171 at 2698.
183 LMS/TEH, supra note 9 at para 114.
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law in the scenario when there is no reasonable Parliament. If it could be guaran-
teed that Parliament would be reasonable, there is no real need for constitutional
supremacy—parliamentary supremacy would offer adequate protection for subjects
within a framework of a representative government.
The thesis in this article is that the CA’s categorisation of “extra-legal arguments”
should not be taken as a dismissal of all considerations that are not explicitly written
into the law. Indeed, the CA did not intend to dismiss all such considerations, which
could still form part and parcel of interpretation of the law. This is evident in the
opening reference to the views of Ronald Dworkin who thinks that principles—
requirements of justice, fairness, or some other dimension of morality—are part
of the law which may be applied by judges. Further, while the CA rejected the
consideration of the legitimacy of the objective of the law, the consideration of such
objectives is arguably retained within the idea of intelligibility of the differentia
chosen by the legislature.
Finally, in the event that an elected legislature fails to act in good faith, a refine-
ment of the CA’s approach through the incorporation of Radbruch’s formula, which
makes pertinent the limited consideration of a higher law, allows a restrained judicial
check on majoritarian power. Such a natural law approach to constitutionalism—the
antithesis of the substantive due process jurisprudence of the US SC because of the
central place it gives to an objective moral law to which the exercise of autonomy is
subject, rather than individual liberty and autonomy—stays true to the premises of
constitutionalism while avoiding the excesses of hypothetical unreasonable legisla-
tures and judiciaries. If objective morality exists and broad historical consensus can
only approximate it, however, the soundness of the approach proposed in this article
hinges on that consensus not going dreadfully wrong. If it does, the approach might
hinder a local legislature desirous of doing right and leave the decision in the hands
of the judiciary.
